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DISCRIMINATION IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE: THE DORMANT




In recent years, natural gas has become a more prevalent source
of energy for several sectors of the U.S. economy, and continues to be
consumed at a greater rate than its production.i In 2008, the United
States had an estimated nearly 1,500 trillion cubic feet of "technically
recoverable tight gas, shale gas, and coalbed methane" resources, a
staggering amount of potential domestic energy.2 While estimates of
precise amounts constantly fluctuate,3 natural gas production in 2010
reached its highest level in over thirty years, with the surge attributed
to the growing increase in extraction from shale formations.4 The De-
partment of Energy estimates that half of the natural gas consumed in
the United States' economy today was extracted from wells drilled
within the last three and a half years.5
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A., 2008 Drake University. I would like to
acknowledge Professor Dan Tarlock and Christopher Grubb for their guidance and constructive
edits. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my family and loved ones for their unbri-
dled support and patience through my law school experience, with particular gratitude reserved
for my late grandfather, without whom none of this would be possible.
1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PRIMER 3-4 (2009) (hereinafter "DOE Primer").
2. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 97 (Oct. 2011) "Techni-
cally recoverable" gas refers to "resources... that are producible using current technology with-
out reference to the economic viability thereof." Id.
3. Expansion of exploration and drilling provides more comprehensive data on the
amounts and recoverability of certain gas resources. For example, in 2011 the U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration ("EIA") estimated there were 827 trillion cubic feet of "technically recov-
erable unproved shale gas resources" when making projections on energy supply, demand, and
prices through 2035. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 79 (2011).
In 2012 the EIA has dropped the estimate to 482 trillion cubic feet, with the decline largely at-
tributed to smaller estimated reserves in the Marcellus Shale. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 9 (2012).
4. THE WHITE HOUSE, BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 9 (2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint-secure-energy-future.pdf.
5. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at4.
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The recent explosion of natural gas drilling in the Marcellus Shale
region has been accompanied by an explosion of news,6 research,7 and
academic scholarship8 on the controversial extraction method known
as hydraulic fracturing ("fracking"). These sources primarily discuss
whether the actual practice of fracking-the high-pressure injection of
chemicals into underground shale formations-poses a threat to un-
derground sources of drinking water. Aside from these very real con-
cerns, the prevalence of fracking has brought attention to an additional
public health issue-how to handle, treat, and dispose of the millions
of gallons of wastewater that results from the practice.
Pennsylvania is a prime example of a state where industry has
jumped headfirst into the lucrative practice of fracking before full leg-
islative consideration of its inevitable externalities. While Pennsylva-
nia is one of the leaders in extracting natural gas via fracking,9 its
current regulatory structure is inadequate to deal with the massive
amounts of wastewater that fracking creates. The two primary meth-
ods of disposing this waste-treatment or permanent underground
injection-are largely unavailable in Pennsylvania.lo Lacking an ade-
quate internal method of wastewater disposal, Pennsylvania drillers
have turned to an alternate source: Ohio.
6. In the NEW YORK TIMES alone, see e.g., Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells' Tainted
Water Hits Rivers, Feb. 27, 2011, at Al; Ian Urbina, Wastewater Recycling No Cure-All in Gas Pro-
cess, Mar. 2, 2011, at Al; Ian Urbina, Pressure Limits Efforts to Police Drilling for Gas, Mar. 4, 2011,
at Al; Ian Urbina, Insiders Sound an Alarm Amid a Natural Gas Rush, Jun. 26, 2011, at Al; Ian
Urbina, Rush to Drill for Natural Gas Creates Conflicts with Mortgages, Oct. 20, 2011, at Al; Eliza
Griswold, The Fracturing of Pennsylvania, Nov. 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/magazine/fracking-amwell-township.html; Ian Urbina,
Learning Too Late of Perils in Gas Well Leases, Dec. 2, 2011, at Al.
7. Large-scale environmental studies have been initiated at both the state and federal level.
See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
INVESTIGATION OF GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING (2011) (U.S. EPA's
investigation to determine the presence of ground water contamination as a result of hydraulic
fracturing); NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM
(2011) (New York state's ongoing environmental impact study assessing the risks of high-volume
hydraulic fracturing).
8. See, e.g., Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hydraulically Fracturing a Natu-
ral Gas Well, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (2012); Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism: Support
for an Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 913
(2011); Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Pro-
duction and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115 (2009).
9. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Pennsylvania Drives Northeast Natural Gas
Production Growth (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2870.
Total natural gas production in West Virginia and Pennsylvania had reached nearly 4 billion cubic
feet per day (Bcf/d), a 500% increase since 2008.
10. See infra Part II.
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For example, in late 2011, the U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration ("EIA") estimated that the southwest portion of Pennsylvania
alone-adjacent to Ohio-produced nearly one billion cubic feet of
natural gas per day (Bcf/d), an increase of over 300% since the begin-
ning of 2010.11 According to reporting data on the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Protection's website,12 nearly 522,000
resulting barrels of "brine," "frac fluids," and "drilling fluids" were dis-
posed through "injection disposal wells." Of these barrels, 2,380 were
disposed of in Pennsylvania, and 4,079 disposed of in West Virginia.
The remaining 515,000 barrels went to Ohio, representing over 98% of
the total Pennsylvania waste disposed through injection wells in
2011.13
Faced with a flood of out-of-state wastewater crossing its border,
Ohio amended its own oil and gas laws to include a provision that im-
poses a two-tier disposal fee, with amounts based on the waste's place
of origin.14 Waste that originates in the state and is disposed of at an
Ohio underground injection well is taxed at five cents per barrel, while
waste that originates from out of state is subject to a tax of twenty
cents per barrel.15 Ohio collected $1.45 million in taxes in 2011.16
Although one could argue this new provision furthers Ohio's in-
terest in protecting its environment and the health of its citizens and
raises revenue for its regulatory program, the Supreme Court has fre-
quently invalidated state laws that impose free-flow restrictions, high-
er fees, or outright bans on interstate waste on Constitutional
grounds.17 While the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit states
from enacting laws such as these, the Court has interpreted the Consti-
tution's affirmative grant of Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce as exclusive, meaning that states have no authority to erect
economic obstacles at their borders.18 A difference of a mere fifteen
11. EIA,supra note 9.
12. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection publishes statewide data of
both the amount of oil and gas produced within the Marcellus Shale, as well as the amount of
waste produced, every six months. It is available at
https://www.paoilandgasreporting.state.pa.us/publicreports/Modules/DataExports/DataExport
s.aspx (last visited June 30, 2012) (hereinafter "DEP Waste Database"). All figures, unless at-
tributed otherwise, come from the author's calculations derived from this data.
13. Mark Niquette, Frocking Fluid Soaks Ohio, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-22/fracking-fluid-soaks-ohio.
14. See OHlo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.22(H)(1) (West 2012). See also discussion infra Part III.
15. Id.
16. Niquette, supra note 13.




cents per barrel may seem trivial, particularly in the multi-billion dol-
lar natural gas industry, but the Court has been hesitant to view this
issue in shades of grey, particularly when the perceived obstruction to
interstate commerce is explicit rather than incidental or unintended.19
This Note argues that although the safety of fracking as a whole is
currently under rightful scrutiny, access to the safest or least harmful
methods of waste disposal will be critical in protecting public health as
long as fracking is allowed, particularly in the absence of a federal reg-
ulatory regime.20 Barriers to accessing the safest methods of waste
disposal are incompatible with a national effort to retrieve natural gas
as efficiently and safely as possible, particularly when those barriers
are not erected for health and safety reasons.
Part I of this Note briefly explains the history and process of hy-
draulic fracturing, and how this method of extracting natural gas cre-
ates large amounts of "flowback water" that must be disposed of safely.
Part II details the current available options for disposal of this
wastewater byproduct, with particular emphasis on Pennsylvania's
regulatory means for disposal. Part III examines Ohio's regulatory
structure for fracking and its impact on the interstate waste market.
Part IV then outlines the history and progression of the "dormant
Commerce Clause" as applied to the interstate waste market. Finally,
Part V determines whether Ohio has created an unconstitutional re-
striction on the free flow of fracking waste through interstate com-
merce, and based on Supreme Court precedent, ultimately answers
that question in the affirmative.
I. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND FLOWBACK WATER
A. How Fracking Works
While fracking has attracted a significant amount of attention in
recent years, commercial oil and gas operators have used hydraulic
fracturing since 1949.21 In fact, oil and gas operators have used liquids,
including nitroglycerin, in attempts to stimulate hard rock wells since
the 1860S.22
19. See id.
20. See infra Part 1.B.
21. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2008).
22. Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing - History of an Enduring
Technology, 62 1. OF PETROLEUM TECH. 26, 27 (Dec. 2010). Stanolind Oil conducted the first recog-
nized experimental fracking treatment, injecting 1,000 gallons of thick napalm into a well in Grant
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Hydraulic fracturing as a method of extracting natural gas has be-
come a lucrative practice in recent years for numerous reasons. First,
there are abundant natural gas resources within the United States,
most notably the Marcellus Shale underlying vast segments of Penn-
sylvania, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia that is widely believed to
hold trillions of cubic feet of natural gas.23 Immense amounts of natu-
ral gas also exist within Texas' Barnett Shale, the Haynesville/Bossier
Shale on the Texas/Louisiana border, Michigan's Antrim Shale, the
Fayetteville Shale beneath Arkansas/Oklahoma, and the New Albany
Shale underlying much of Illinois and Indiana.24
Second, natural gas burns more cleanly and efficiently than coal or
oil.25 In fact, the burning of natural gas emits only approximately half
the carbon dioxide as coal, with significantly fewer quantities of carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter as
well.26 Because of its status as the cleanest burning fossil fuel, natural
gas is generally seen as an important contributor to reducing green-
house gas emissions in the United States.27
Third, recent technological advancements in the industry, namely
horizontal drilling (described below), have made access to these previ-
ously untapped resources easier and more profitable.28 Although cost-
lier than traditional vertical drilling, horizontal drilling allows the well
driller to access greater reserves of natural gas.29
When a well is fracked, it is initially drilled in the same manner as
any typical drilling operation.30 Operators start by drilling wells verti-
cally, but then turn the drill bit horizontally-sometimes extending
over a mile-so that it laterally penetrates what the operator has
County, Kansas, with little results. Two years later the Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company
began fracking wells in Texas and Oklahoma using a mixture crude oil, gasoline, and sand.
23. Compare, the U.S. EIA estimates supra note 2 with DANIEL J. SOEDER & WILLIAM M. KAPPEL,
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SERVICE, WATER RESOURCES AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION FROM THE
MARCELLUS SHALE 3 (2009) (citing a 2008 estimate of 363 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural
gas within the Marcellus Shale).
24. David M. Kargbo, Ron G. Wilhelm & David J. Campbell, Natural Gas Plays in the Marcellus
Shale: Challenges and Potential Opportunities, 44 ENvTL. SCI. & TECH. 5679 (2010). See also DOE
Primer, supra note 1, at 17-24 (charting the size and estimated natural gas reserves in each the
aforementioned shales).
25. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 5-6.
28. Joseph A. Dammel, Notes from Underground: Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus Shale,
12 MINN. J.L. Sa. & TECH. 773, 778 (2011).
29. Id.




deemed to be productive strata of shale containing oil or gas.31 By pen-
etrating the shale formation horizontally rather than vertically, more
of the strata is exposed and more gas can be recovered with a single
drilling operation.32
The operator then pumps a fluid mixture down the well at a calcu-
lated pressure, which both expands natural fractures in the shale and
creates new ones, exposing more surface area.33 Included in this mix-
ture are chemical proppants, which prevent these fractures from clos-
ing and allow the gas to more productively return up the wellbore.34
Because the lateral/horizontal portion of the well can stretch for thou-
sands of feet, it is generally not possible to maintain a high enough
pressure to sufficiently fracture the shale formation with a single injec-
tion of fluids.3s Consequently, the fracturing process is repeated in
several stages to ensure the shale in its entirety is sufficiently frac-
tured, with each stage using different volumes of fracture fluids with
calculated percentages of additives.36
B. Fracking Fluid and Flowback Water
The fluid used in the fracturing process consists of several million
gallons of water, which makes up approximately 98% or more of the
fluid's composition.37 The immense quantities of water used in the
fracking process may be a deterrent in dry south and southwestern
states, but the Marcellus Shale has plentiful water resources available,
both at the surface and below ground.38 In Pennsylvania, for example,
much of the water originates from local rivers, where it is withdrawn
by drilling companies, trucked to their well sites, and stored on-site.39
31. FRED BOSSELMAN & JOEL B. EISEN, ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 279 (3d ed.
2010).
32. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 46-47.
33. Id. at 56.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id.
37. Wiseman, supra note 30, at 238-39; DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 61, 64.
38. CHARLES W. ABDALLA & JoY R. DROHAN, PENN STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES,
MARCELLUS EDUCATION FACT SHEET - WATER WITHDRAWALS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MARCELLUS SHALE GAS
IN PENNSYLVANIA 1 (2010), http://pubs.cas.psu.edu/freepubs/pdfs/ua460.pdf (hereinafter "Mar-
cellus Fact Sheet").




t.pdf (describing the authority of the Susquehanna River Basin Commission, which "was created
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The remaining 1-2% of the concentration of fracking fluid consists
of specially designed chemicals to enhance the fracking process.40 The
precise chemical composition of fracking chemicals is proprietary, and
therefore not generally disclosed.41 Typical additives in the fluids in-
clude sand, oils, gels, acids, alcohols, and various organic chemicals.42
These additives serve several purposes, including reducing friction,
preventing microorganisms from impairing the natural gas, and pre-
venting corrosion of metal pipes, among others.43
Several states have passed laws requiring drillers to disclose the
contents of their fracking fluids before they are allowed to drill, alt-
hough chemicals labeled "trade secrets" are generally exempted.44
Stricter state regulation of fracking fluids has become necessary due to
the lack of federal oversight; as long as diesel fuel is not injected, the
actual practice of fracking is currently exempt from federal regulation,
including the disclosure of chemical constituents of fracking fluidS.45
In June of 2009, the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of
Chemicals Act (the "FRAC Act") was first introduced to CongreSS.46 The
bill seeks to remove this exemption, as well as require more strict dis-
closure of the chemicals used by the industry. As of this writing, the bill
currently awaits committee action in both the House and Senate, with
some states explicitly opposing federal oversight of fracking because
they believe its regulation should be left to the individual states.47
to protect water quality, create flood mitigation projects, and regulate water withdrawals" in the
northern regions of the Marcellus Shale).
40. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 61.
41. Kargbo, supra note 24, at 5681.
42. Marcellus Fact Sheet, supra note 38, at 7.
43. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 61-63.
44. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.10(A)(9)(a) (West 2012) (requiring drillers to dis-
close additives "intentionally added to facilitate the drilling of any portion of the well" but not
including information designated as a "trade secret"); WYo R. AND REG. OIL GEN Ch. 3 §§ 45(d), 45(f)
(West 2012) (requiring well owners or operators to provide "the chemical additives, compounds,
and concentrations" used in each stage of well stimulation, but allowing the driller to apply for a
trade secret/proprietary information exemption); ARK ADMIN. CODE 178.00.1-B-19(l)(3) (West
2012) (requiring any person who performs hydraulic fracturing within the state to disclose the
fluids and additives used in those fluids to the state's Oil and Gas Commission, with a limited
trade secret exception). Michigan also recently passed regulations requiring operators to publicly
post Material Safety Data Sheets for the chemical additives used in drilling on the Department of
Environmental Quality's website. See News Release, Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality, Michigan Issues New Ordersfor Fracking, (May 25, 2011),
http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,1607,7-135-256844-,00.html.
45. See discussion of the Safe Drinking Water Act, infra Part II.A.
46. FRAC Act, H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill has been re-introduced in the House as
H.R. 1084, 112th Congress (2011) and in the Senate as S.587, 112th Congress (2011).
47. See, e.g., H.R. 6025, 2011 Leg. (Kan. 2011) (urging Congress to allow the Kansas Corpora-
tion Commission to regulate hydraulic fracturing without federal pre-emption); H.R. 3008, 62d
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After the fracking treatment is completed, approximately 20 -
30% of the millions of gallons of water used returns to the surface,
contaminated with the chemicals and proppants used in the fluid as
well as various contaminants naturally present within the shale.48 This
fluid can include high concentrations of salt and naturally occurring
radioactive materials such as uranium, thorium, radium, and lead,49 as
well as harmful compounds such as benzene.5o
This fluid, sometimes referred to as "flowback water" or
"wastewater," is typically recovered in a matter of hours but can con-
tinue to surface for several weeks to months after the well has begun
to produce natural gas.si Once it returns to the surface, the flowback
water is separated from the natural gas and then stored in steel tanks
or trucks at the well site.52
II. COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL OF FLOWBACK WATER
A. Available Options
There are a limited number of options for disposing of flowback
water once it is collected at the well surface. As discussed below, pos-
sible methods of disposal include (1) injection into underground injec-
tion wells for permanent disposal, (2) discharging the flowback water
to publicly owned treatment works ("POTWs") or commercial treat-
ment plants, or (3) treating and recycling the flowback water for reuse
in fracking operations.
1. Underground Injection and the Safe Drinking Water Act
The primary vehicle for disposing of flowback water is under-
ground injection.53 At the federal level, the Safe Drinking Water Act
("SDWA") regulates any underground injection of flowback water to
Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2011) (urging Congress to expressly delegate hydraulic fracturing
responsibility to the states).
48. Andrea Shramko & Tor Palmgren, Analytical Characterization of Flowback Waters in the
Field, 16TH ANNUAL PETROLEUM AND BIOFUELS ENVIRONMENTAL CONFERENCE (IPEC) (Nov. 3-5, 2009),
available at http://ipec.utulsa.edu/Conf2009/Papers%20received/Shramko_106.pdf (last visited
June 30, 2012.)
49. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION WASTES,
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/tenorm/oilandgas.html (last visited June 30, 2012.)
50. Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells' Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26,
2011.
51. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 66.
52. Ramudo, supra note 39, at 9.
53. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 68.
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ensure that underground sources of drinking water are not endan-
gered.54 The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
regulates this practice through its Underground Injection Control
("UIC") program created pursuant to Part C of the SDWA,ss and may
delegate the authority to administer the UIC program to individual
states.56
The federal UIC program classifies wells into several different cat-
egories,57 but only Class II UIC wells may receive fracking fluids.58
Class II wells can receive fluids that are brought to the surface through
oil or natural gas production, as well as other fluids that are injected
underground, such as frac fluids, that are meant to enhance oil and gas
production.s These wells, however, cannot simply be drilled in any
location; they require a porous and permeable underground formation
to safely receive and store the injected fluids.60
Notably, the definition of "underground injection" within the
SDWA specifically excludes "the underground injection of fluids or
propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic frac-
turing operations."61 Critics colloquially refer to this exemption as the
"Halliburton Loophole."62 The actual practice of fracking a well, there-
fore, does not fall within SDWA jurisdiction-unless diesel fuel is
used-but the disposal of wastewater via underground injection does.
Although underground injection is the widely preferred method of
wastewater disposal,63 the practice is not without scrutiny. In 2011, a
series of eleven earthquakes throughout the area near Youngstown,
Ohio resulted in the closure of an underground injection well.64 State
officials instituted a moratorium on injecting wastes within a five-mile
radius of the well to allow scientists to analyze seismographic data.65
Local seismologists believe that the high-pressure injection of
54. The SWDA is found at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f - 300j (West 2012).
55. See 40 C.F.R. § 144 (West 2012).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-1.
57. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.6.
58. Id. at § 144.6(b).
59. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CLASS 11 WELLS,
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
60. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 68.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2012).
62. See Powers, supra note 8, at 939 n.161.
63. DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 68.





wastewater triggered an ancient fault line.66 A similar moratorium
occurred in Arkansas in early 2011 after a series of seismic events took
place near injection well activity.6?
2. Wastewater Treatment and the Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") prohibits any unauthorized dis-
charge of pollutants into navigable waters of the United States.68 "POl-
lutant" includes, in relevant part, "chemical wastes," "radioactive
materials," and "industrial... waste."69 Flowback water is specifically
exempted from the definition of "pollutant," but only in circumstances
where it is being re-injected into an active well or a disposal well.70 In
these situations, flowback water is already regulated under the afore-
mentioned SDWA, although flowback water being re-injected into an
active well via hydraulic fracturing would be exempt from SDWA regu-
lation under the aforementioned "Halliburton Loophole." In any other
scenario, flowback water is considered a pollutant under the CWA and
thus cannot be directly discharged into navigable waters without a
permit.71
The most common way that wastewater falls under the jurisdic-
tion of the CWA is through a public owned treatment works ("POTW").
POTWs are treatment plants that receive wastewater from residential,
commercial, and industrial facilities and remove harmful contaminants
so that the water may be safely discharged into a water body.72 Before
an industrial user discharges waste to a POTW for treatment, the waste
must comply with the CWA's National Pretreatment Program, which is
66. See e.g., Ohio Quakes Probably Triggered by Waste Disposal Well, Say Seismologists,
LAMONT-DOHERTY EARTH OBSERVATORY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (January 6, 2012),
http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/news-events/seismologists-link-ohio-earthquakes-waste-
disposal-wells.
67. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INDUCED SEISMICITY POTENTIAL IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
(Pre-Publication Version), 120 (2012), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id=13355 (hereinafter "Induced Seismicity Study").
68. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a), 1342(a) (West 2012) (authorizing discharges with a permit).
69. Id. at § 1362(6).
70. See id. at § 1362(6)(B) (exempting "water derived in association with oil or gas produc-
tion and disposed of in a well, if the well used... for disposal purposes is approved by authority of
the State in which the well is located, and if such State determines that such injection or disposal
will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water resources.").
71. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342. Persons may receive permits which authorize discharges of pollu-
tants through the CWA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). These
permits contain industry-specific, technology-based limits on concentrations of pollutants, as well
as mandate monitoring and reporting requirements on the permit holder.
72. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1292(2). See also Streamlining the General Pretreatment Regulations for
Existing and New Sources of Pollution, 70 FR 60134-36 (West 2012).
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meant to ensure that pollutants do not interfere with the operation of a
POTW or pass through the POTW untreated.73 POTWs develop their
own pretreatment standards based on the federal regulationS,74 and
industrial dischargers must comply with these standards when send-
ing waste to a POTW.75 In addition, water that is discharged from a
POTW after treatment must comply with a National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit as well, since this water
is directly discharged into a navigable water.76
3. Recycling of Flowback Water
An additional option that has become popular with both state reg-
ulatory agencies and the fracking industry is reusing or recycling flow-
back water in fracking operations.77 By recovering flowback water
from one well and then reusing it as frac fluid in another well, drillers
can greatly reduce costs and limit the amount of fresh water used in
fracking operations.78 The current lack of federal oversight in the actu-
al fracking process, however, may make this a less desirable option
from an environmental standpoint. Wells that receive waste for per-
manent disposal are specifically designed by EPA standards under the
SDWA to prevent contamination of underground drinking sources.79 A
production well that reuses flowback water as frac fluid, however,
would not be subject to these federal requirements,8o which could re-
sult in greater danger of underground contamination if the relevant
state drilling regulations are inadequate. Additionally, recycling tech-
nologies are still new and can be costly for drillers; thus, permanent
disposal likely will remain the more attractive option until recycling
becomes more technologically and economically feasible.el
B. Current Pennsylvania Laws and Regulations Concerning Flowback
The oil and gas laws and regulations in Pennsylvania require well
operators to properly handle flowback water the moment it originates
73. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.2 (West 2012)
74. See 40 C.F.R. § 405-471 (listing specified standards for particular industrial dischargers).
75. 70 FR 60137 (West 2012)
76. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342.
77. Wiseman, supra note 30, at 267-68.
78. Id.
79. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h(b) (West 2012).
80. See supra Part II.A.1 (stating that the actual practice of fracking is exempt from federal
regulation).
81. Wiseman, supra note 30, at 268.
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at the well site, as spills of flowback water can severely damage the
environment due to its salty and potentially toxic content. Well opera-
tors must capture all substances produced from the well in a pit, tank,
or series of both.82
Well operators must report the types and volumes of the waste
produced at the site, along with the names and addresses of the waste
disposal facility and waste hauler who actually performed the dispos-
al.83 Waste produced from the drilling, alteration, or operation of a
well must be disposed of in a manner consistent with Pennsylvania's
Clean Streams Law and Solid Waste Management Act.84 The Clean
Streams Law allows discharges of pollutants into the waters of the
state if the discharger obtains a permit or the discharge is specifically
authorized,85 and Pennsylvania's oil and gas laws explicitly prohibit
well owners from discharging their waste fluids onto the ground or
into the state's waters without a such a permit or approval.86
The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ("De-
partment") authorizes discharge of fracking wastewater from POTWs
if certain criteria are met,87 but in response to rising levels of bromide
in the heavily fracked western portion of the state, the Department has
called for all natural gas drilling operators to cease delivering fracking
wastewater to POTWs.88 Recent statutory amendments require the
Department to ensure that any facility that applies for an NPDES per-
mit for treating and discharging oil and gas wastewater "is operated by
a competent and qualified individual."89
The decision to prohibit the disposal of produced water at POTWs
greatly reduced the available options for the fracking industry's
wastewater disposal within Pennsylvania's borders, as the state only
has six Class 11 UIC wells that can receive waste from oil and gas opera-
82. 25 PA. CODE § 78.56(a) (West 2012). The tanks and pits must have "sufficient capacity to
contain all pollutional substances and wastes which are used or produced during drilling, altering,
completing, and plugging [of] the well." Pits must be impermeable and constructed with a syn-
thetic liner of sufficient strength and thickness so as to be resistant to physical, chemical, or other
failure during use. Id. § 78.56(a)(4)(i).
83. Id. § 78.65(3)(v).
84. Id. § 78.55.
85. 35 PA. STAT.ANN. § 691.202 (West 2012).
86. 25 PA. CODE § 78.57(a).
87. Id. § 95.10(b).
88. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, DEP Calls on Natural Gas Drill-
ers to Stop Giving Treatment Facilities Wastewater,
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=%2017071%
20&typeid=1 (last visited June 30, 2012).
89. See H.B. 1950, 196th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012) § 3218(b.5) (West 2012).
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tions.90 As previously stated, from January 2011 to June 2011, 515,000
barrels of "brine," "frac fluids," and "drilling fluids" produced in Penn-
sylvania were disposed of via injection well in Ohio.91 In the preceding
six months-the final full reporting period before the Department's
instruction to stop delivering to POTWs-approximately 351,000 bar-
rels of the same fluids were disposed of via injection well in OhiO.92
Thus, in just six months, the total amount of fracking waste shipped to
Ohio disposal wells jumped 68%.
Ill. OHIO AND SENATE BILLS 165 AND 315
The only approved methods for disposing of flowback water in the
state of Ohio are (1) underground injection, (2) surface application for
ice and dust control, (3) permitted methods of secondary recovery in
oil and gas drilling, and (4) other methods specifically approved by the
Ohio Department of Natural Resources ("ODNR").93 Notably, Ohio does
not allow for the disposal of flowback water by discharging it into wa-
ter bodies, either directly or indirectly through POTWs. This is because
the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, which is the state entity
responsible for issuing NPDES permits, refuses to issue such permits to
POTWs seeking to receive flowback water because it believes that dis-
posal is purely within the jurisdiction of ODNR,94 which regulates the
state's underground injection control program and its 176 Class 11
wells that receive flowback water.95
In the months before the Ohio General Assembly passed Senate
Bill 165 ("S.B. 165") in 2010, supporters of the bill within the Ohio oil
and gas industry voiced concerns that increased amounts of Pennsyl-
90. Niquette, supra note 13. EPA has not granted Pennsylvania the authority to administer
its own UIC program under the SDWA, so the program is federally implemented. See 40 C.F.R. §
147.1951 (West 2012).
91. DEP Waste Database, supra note 12.
92. Id.
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.22(C)(1) (West 2012).
94. Memorandum from Ohio Environmental Protection Agency Scott J. Nally to Ohio De-
partment of Natural Resources Director David Mustine (May 16, 2011), available at
http://www.ohioenvironmentallawblog.com/uploads/file/POTWBrine-DisposalLetter-nayll(
2).pdf. See also News Release, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, "Statement from Ohio EPA
Director Scott Nally on Today's Filing by the Ohio Attorney General's Office Concerning Patriot
Water Treatment and City of Warren's Permit Appeals Before the Environmental Review Appeals
Commission" (Nov. 1, 2011),
http://www.epa.state.oh.us/portals/47/nr/2011/november/Patriot-WarrenERACAction.pdf
(restating the Ohio EPA's belief that disposing oil field brine via a wastewater treatment facility is
illegal).
95. See 40 C.F.R. § 147.1800 (acknowledging that EPA has approved Ohio's program for Class
II UIC wells). See also Niquette, supra note 13.
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vania flowback water would begin to find their way across the bor-
der.96 On March 24, 2010, the Ohio General Assembly passed S.B. 165,
a comprehensive overhaul of the state's oil and gas drilling laws.97 The
bill was lauded as a collaborative effort between members of the Ohio
Department of Natural Resources and the Ohio Oil and Gas Association
to update the state's oil and gas regulatory program for the first time in
nearly 25 years.8 In addition to the "protection of public health, safety,
and the environment," as well as addressing persistent concerns over
drilling in urban areas, one of the stated goals of the S.B. 165 overhaul
was to "[i]ncrease revenue to the state regulatory program to sustain-
able, adequate levels through a variety of fees and assessments upon
the regulated industry."99 The bill went into effect on June 30, 2010.1oo
From a Constitutional perspective, the pertinent portion of S.B.
165 was its amendment of Section 1509.221 of the Ohio Revised Code,
now found in Section 1509.22(H).oi Section 1509.22(H) imposes a fee
of five cents per barrel on the owner of an Ohio Class II injection well
for receiving waste that is "produced within the division of oil and gas
resources management regulatory district in which the well is located
or within an adjoining... district."102 If the received waste was not
produced within such a district or an adjoining district, the fee is twen-
ty cents per barrel.103 The amount of barrels upon which the fee can be
levied is capped at 500,000 per calendar year, and well owners who
receive over 500,000 total barrels are instructed to apply the twenty-
cent fee to all applicable barrels first.104
96. Spencer Hunt, Gas Wells' Leftovers May Wash into Ohio, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, January
10, 2010, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2010/01/11/gas-wells-leftovers-
may-end-up-here.html (last visited June 30, 2012) (quoting Tom Stewart, vice president of the
Ohio Oil and Gas Association as saying, "I have a big problem ... that (well) capacity isn't over-
loaded by out-of-state water," and Jack Shaner, lobbyist for the Ohio Environmental Council, as
saying "We're looking at a wave of toxic brine headed into this state.").
97. 2010 Ohio Laws File 27 (Sub. S.B. 165) (hereinafter "Ohio Sub. S.B. 165").
98. Ohio Senate Environment and Natural Resources Committee, Sponsor Testimony of Sen.
Tom Niehaus (2009), http://208.68.184.222/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Sbl65-
SponsorTestimony-Niehaus001.pdf (last visited June 30, 2012).
99. Id.
100. See Ohio Sub. S.B. 165, supra note 97.
101. On May 24, 2012, the Ohio General Assembly passed Senate Bill 315 ("S.B. 315"). S.B.
315 reorganized Ohio's drilling and injection laws, moving the two-tier disposal fee provision to a
new section without substantively amending it. S.B. 315 is effective in full as of September 10,
2012.
102. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.22(H)(1).
103. Id. § 1509.22(H)(1)(b). In either case, the well owner is instructed to collect the fee and
forward it to the state, but may retain up to 3% for him or herself. Id. § 1509.22(H)(3).
104. Id. § 1509.22(H)(2).
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The Ohio Legislative Service Commission ("LSC"), which "provides
nonpartisan drafting, fiscal, research, training, and other legislative
services to the General Assembly,"1o5 prepared a final analysis of S.B.
165 when it passed both houses of the General Assembly. The LSC had
this to say about the fee provisions:
A constitutional issue may be raised with regard to the act's provi-
sions that establish a two-tier injection well disposal fee on the dis-
posal of waste from oil and gas operations.... If a court determines
that the higher fee, which would be levied on waste generated out of
state that is disposed of in this state, results in a differential treat-
ment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, it is conceivable
that the court would hold that the higher fee violates the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.106
The remainder of this Note will focus on whether Ohio's fee provi-
sions are in fact a violation of the Commerce Clause.
IV. INTERSTATE WASTE TRANSPORT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In 1787, Alexander Hamilton described the defects of the United
States under the Articles of Confederation:
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contra-
ry to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given
just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared
that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control,
would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious
sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the
intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.107
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, ratified just two years later,
states that Congress shall have the power "to regulate Com-
merce... among the several States."los Although the text of this clause
only gives Congress an affirmative grant of regulatory power over the
states, the Commerce Clause "has long been understood to have a 'neg-
ative' aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discrimi-
nate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce."109
This judicially crafted "dormant commerce clause" doctrine has several
105. LSC Staff Services, http://www.Isc.state.oh.us/brochure/services.pdf (last visited June
30, 2012).
106. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, FINAL ANALYSIS OF SUB. S.B. 165, 60 (2010).
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). See also Nat. Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (slip op. at 13-14) (synthesizing founders' views
that regulation of commerce under the Articles of Confederation "proved unworkable" because
individual states "understandably focused on their own economic interests [and] often failed to
take actions critical to the success of the Nation as a whole").
108. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
109. Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
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justifications, such as historical preference for unimpeded trade be-
tween the states, as well as protecting out-of-state residents from be-
ing unfairly burdened by laws passed by other state legislatures in
which they have no political representation.1lo
The Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma explained the rationale for this
interpretation thusly:
The few simple words of the Commerce Clause - 'The Congress shall
have Power... To regulate Commerce ... among the several
States...' - reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an
immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the con-
viction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid
the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued re-
lations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.111
And in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.:
This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has
the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy... has as
its corollary that the states are not separable economic units.112
Constitutional restrictions on state power under this clause are
not unlimited; states still retain broad authority under their general
police powers to regulate matters of local concern-even if interstate
commerce is affected-as long as there is no federal legislation to the
contrary.113 However, a state must regulate local interests in such a
way that it does not place itself in a position of economic isolation or
arbitrarily discriminate against articles of commerce from outside its
borders.114
Today, courts typically utilize a two-step analysis when determin-
ing whether a statutory or regulatory regime violates the dormant
commerce clause.115 The initial step requires the court to determine
whether the scheme in question facially discriminates against inter-
110. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, Environmental justice, and the
Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1250-51 (1997). See also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) ("Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no
foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may
look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploi-
tation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which
has given it reality.").
111. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
112. 336 U.S. at 537-38.
113. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).
114. Id.
115. William J. Cantrell, Cleaning Up the Mess: United Haulers, The Dormant Commerce Clause,
and Transaction Cost Economics, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 151 (2009).
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state commerce.116 "Discrimination" against interstate commerce is
achieved if "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests ... benefits the former and burdens the latter."117 Laws that
discriminate in such a manner are overwhelmingly struck down as per
se constitutional violations,118 surviving only if the state demonstrates
the law in question advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory means.119
Laws that are facially discriminatory but meet this lofty burden
are deemed valid under the Constitution. Laws that are not facially
discriminatory are then subject to the second stage of the analysis,
which is a "much more flexible"12o balancing test, as first articulated in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.121 Under this balancing test, a law does not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it (1) regulates even-handedly
to protect a legitimate public interest, (2) its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, and (3) the burden imposed on inter-
state commerce is clearly not excessive in relation to the local benefits
being derived.122
In examining the Commerce Clause and waste transport, the Su-
preme Court has held that garbage is indeed an article of commerce,
"not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing
and disposing of it."123 State regulation that affects the transportation
and disposal of waste is therefore subject to the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis outlined above. In several previous instances, states
have made efforts to keep out-of-state garbage from entering their
jurisdictions, consequently raising difficult Constitutional questions.124
A history of the Court's landmark decisions in this area, referred to as
"the Garbage Wars,"125 is detailed below.
116. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338
(2007).
117. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (citing Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
118. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
119. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
120. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
121. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
122. Id.
123. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994). See also Philadelphia,
437 U.S. at 622 (stating that the "transportation and disposal of valueless waste between states"
constitutes commerce).
124. Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6
(2003).
125. See Jane Chuang, Who Should Win the Garbage Wars? Lessons from the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Act, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2403, 2405 n.26 (2004).
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A. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Line is Drawn
The dispute in Philadelphia centered on a New Jersey statute pro-
hibiting the importation of "any solid or liquid waste which originated
or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State," with very
limited exception.126 Operators of private landfills in New Jersey, as
well as out of state operators who had contracted with these operators
to dispose of their waste, alleged the import ban violated the Com-
merce Clause.127
The Court focused its inquiry on whether the statute at issue was
simply a measure of economic protectionism-likely per se invalid-or
whether the statute could "fairly be viewed as a law directed to legiti-
mate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are
only incidental."128 The Court considered only the effect of the statute,
not its purpose, stating that "whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose,
it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of com-
merce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently."129
The Court ultimately held the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause, on its face, it imposed a ban on out-of-state commercial inter-
ests.130 New Jersey conceded that there was no basis to distinguish
out-of-state waste once it reached their landfills, and thus the Court
found there was no rational reason to ban the importation of one and
not the other.131
Before Philadelphia, the Court had recognized that states had the
power to ban the importation of infectious materials that could spread
disease and endanger public health; "quarantine laws" such as these
"ha[d] not been considered forbidden protectionist measures, even
though they were directed against out-of-state commerce."132 The
Philadelphia majority, however, differentiated quarantine laws as re-
strictions on articles of commerce that inherently created a risk of con-
126. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618 (1978).
127. Id.at619.
128. Id. at 624 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
129. Id. at 626-27. The stated purpose of the law was to protect the environment and public
health from the rapid increase in volume of solid and liquid waste entering the state. The appel-
lants contended the purpose of the law was a financial effort to extend the lives of New Jersey's
landfills and avoid having to transport its waste to out-of-state locations.
130. Id. at 628.
131. Id. at629.
132. Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tagion.133 Traditional landfill waste, on the other hand, did not impose
the same risk and could not be regulated as such.134 Thus, the Court
essentially created a "Hobson's choice" for states and their municipal
waste; they "must either prohibit all landfill operations,... [or] accept
waste from every portion of the United States" to survive Constitution-
al scrutiny.135 In the aftermath of Philadelphia, states wishing to pass
laws restricting the flow of out-of-state wastes entering their borders
began to draft them more carefully to avoid this dilemma.136
B. Fort Gratiot: Facial Discrimination without Reference to State Bor-
ders
Nearly fifteen years after Philadelphia, the Court was asked to de-
termine the constitutional validity of waste import restrictions within
Michigan's Solid Waste Management Act.137 This act prohibited owners
of waste disposal sites from accepting solid waste that was not gener-
ated within the county where the disposal site was located unless ex-
plicitly authorized.138 The petitioner, a private landfill operator,
argued that the statute was an impermissible discrimination against
interstate commerce because it required his business to only accept
local waste.139 Relying on Philadelphia, a lower court ruled the statute
did not discriminate against interstate commerce on its face because
the import restrictions equally applied to waste from other Michigan
counties as well as waste from out-of-state.140
The Supreme Court reversed because it found the import re-
strictions "authorize[d] each of the State's 83 counties to isolate itself
from the national economy."141 It rejected the respondent's argument
that the statute evenhandedly regulated in-state and out-of-state
commerce and that its burden on interstate commerce was not clearly
excessive in relation to its local benefits.142 In doing so, the Court re-
lied in part on Brimmer v. Rebman,143 in which the Court struck down a
133. Id. at 628-29.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Chuang, supra note 125, at 2417.
137. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep't. of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 355 (1992).
138. Id. at 357.
139. Id
140. Id. at 357-58.
141. Id. at 361.
142. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
143. 138 U.S. 78 (1891).
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Virginia statute imposing additional fees on meat imported into the
state that was slaughtered more than 100 miles from the place of
sale.144 Even though the statute in that case burdened in-state and out-
of-state meat producers similarly, it was still unconstitutional because
"a burden imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be
sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the
people of all the States."145 Thus, the Court showed a willingness to
find a statutory scheme facially discriminatory against interstate com-
merce-even in the absence of explicit references to state borders-so
long as the scheme based its discrimination on the waste's place of
origin.146
C Chemical Waste Management and Oregon Waste Systems: Imposing
Additional Fees on Out-of-State Waste
The Court also decided two cases in the early 1990s that involved
"tipping" fees that were unequally imposed on transporters of out-of-
state waste. Decided on the same day as Fort Gratiot, the dispute in
Chemical Waste Management v Hunt centered on an Alabama statute
that levied an additional $72 per ton on waste and substances disposed
of within Alabama but originating from outside the state.147 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court held this "tipping fee" did not violate the Com-
merce Clause because it did not "needlessly obstruct interstate trade or
attempt to place Alabama in a position of economic isolation."148 Ra-
ther, it believed the state retained its "broad regulatory authority to
protect the health and safety of its citizens," and the tipping fee served
"legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by
available nondiscriminatory alternatives."149
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the addi-
tional fee was "an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with
most of the burden of slowing the flow of waste" into the state.15o The
Court rejected the state's argument that the additional fee served a
legitimate local purpose of protecting the health and safety of its citi-
zens, ruling that the state had failed to meet necessary burden to justi-
144. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361 (citing Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891)).
145. Brimmer, 138 U.S. at 82-83 (quoting Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 326 (1890)).
146. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361.
147. 504 U.S. 334, 338 (1992).
148. Hunt v. Chemical Waste Mgmt, 584 So.2d 1367, 1390 (Ala. 1991).
149. Id.
150. Chemical Waste Mgme, 504 U.S. at 346 (quoting City of Philadelphia. v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 629 (1978)).
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fy a facially discriminatory restriction.isi Staying true to its reasoning
in Philadelphia, the Court found that Alabama did not provide a legiti-
mate reason for only imposing the fee on out-of-state waste as op-
posed to intrastate waste, stating "there is absolutely no
evidence... that waste generated outside Alabama is more dangerous
than waste generated in Alabama."152
Two years later, the Court heard a similar case in which the Ore-
gon Department of Environmental Quality approved a $2.25 per ton
surcharge on out-of-state waste disposed of within Oregon, as opposed
to the comparatively lower fee of $0.85 per ton for in-state waste.153
The Oregon Supreme Court held the out-of-state surcharge constitu-
tional because it was based on the projected costs the State of Oregon
would incur for disposing solid waste generated out of state.154 The fee
was not, in the Oregon Supreme Court's view, "manifestly dispropor-
tionate to the services rendered," and therefore was not facially dis-
criminatory despite the explicit reference to place of origin.155
The United States Supreme Court again reversed, and again stuck
to its reasoning in Philadelphia that the purpose or justification of a
law-in this case, defraying the otherwise uncompensated costs to
Oregon for disposing out-of-state waste-has no bearing on whether
or not it facially discriminates against interstate commerce.156 Because
the surcharge was indeed discriminatory on its face, Oregon had to
show that the surcharge advanced a legitimate local purpose that could
not be adequately served otherwise by nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives.157 The Court invalidated the surcharge as unconstitutional, re-
peating the familiar refrain that the state could offer "no legitimate
reason" to subject out-of-state waste a discriminatory surcharge.158
151. Id. at 342.
152. Id. at 343-44.
153. Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93,96 (U.S. 1994).
154. Id. at 97-98 (deeming the surcharge as not facially discriminatory because of its express
nexus to actual costs incurred by state and local government). See also id. at 109, n.1 (Rehnquist,
C.J. dissenting) (listing the identified costs the Oregon's Environmental Quality Commission based
the surcharge on, including state activities to improve waste management, increased environmen-
tal liability, lost disposal capacity, publicly supported infrastructure improvements, and nuisance
impacts from transportation).
155. Id. at 97-98.
156. Id. at 100.
157. Id. at 100-01.
158. Id. at 108.
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D. The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Roberts Court: United Haul-
ers
The United States Supreme Court's most recent foray with the
dormant Commerce Clause and interstate waste came in 2007, in a
case where a local New York waste management authority required all
waste to be brought to a state-created public facility, where it would be
sorted and sent off for disposal.ls The facility collected "tipping fees"
significantly higher than the open market to cover its costS.160 Waste
haulers challenged this "flow control" ordinance as a violation of the
Commerce Clause.161
The facts closely mirrored C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, a
previous Supreme Court decision, concerning a "flow control" law
which essentially required all of a municipality's solid waste to be first
sent to a private facility.162 However, the flow control in United Haulers
favored a public facility, which the majority found to be a "constitu-
tionally significant" difference.163 The Court upheld the ordinance,
reasoning that unlike private entities, government is responsible for
protecting the health and safety of its citizens.164 Therefore, the Court
held laws favoring local government via flow control, as opposed to
laws favoring private in-state business, do not violate the dormant
commerce clause165
The value of United Haulers for purposes of this note is that it re-
veals the current status of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
should the issue reach the Court again in the near future. Chief Justice
Roberts-replacing Justice Rehnquist, the most ardent supporter of
states' authority to protect its environment and public healthl66-
159. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 335-36
(2007).
160. Id. at 336.
161. Id.at337.
162. 511 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1994). The purpose of the law was to guarantee a minimum flow
of waste to the facility to amortize its costs, as the town planned to purchase the facility after five
years of private operation. Even though the ordinance equally impacted other in-state garbage
processors besides the favored one, the Court nonetheless found the ordinance discriminatory
because it allowed only the favored operator to process waste within the town limits, and thus
deprived out-of-state garbage processors access to the town's local demand. See id. at 387-91.
163. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334.
164. Id. at 342.
165. Id. at 345.
166. In each of the cases outlined in this Section where a statute was struck down on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion. For a brief
summary on the motifs consistently present in each dissent, see Cantrell, supra note 115, at 161-
62.
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authored the majority opinion reaffirming the validity of the tradition-
al two-step dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer in full.167 Justices Alito and Kennedy dissented,
but on the grounds that the "state facility exception" was incompatible
with traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis.168 Only justices
Thomas and Scalia indicated disfavor, both concurring in the judgment
but authoring opinions that the dormant Commerce Clause has no tex-
tual constitutional basis.169 Thus, even without opinions from Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan, the current Roberts Court appears to have a five
Justice majority that accepts the historical interpretation of the
dormant commerce clause.
V. ANALYSIS: IS OHIO'S TWO-TIER DISPOSAL FEE CONSTITUTIONAL?
A. Section 1509.22 is Facially Discriminatory7o
Returning to the legislation in question, Section 1509.22 of the
Ohio Revised Code provides, in pertinent part:
There is levied on the owner of an injection well who has been is-
sued a permit [to operate an underground disposal injection well]
the following fees:
(a) Five cents per barrel of each substance that is delivered to a well
to be injected in the well when the substance is produced within the
division of oil and gas resources management regulatory district in
which the well is located or within an adjoining oil and gas resources
management regulatory district;
(b) Twenty cents per barrel of each substance that is delivered to a
well to be injected in the well when the substance is not produced
within the division of oil and gas resources management regulatory
167. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 333.
168. See id. at 371 (Alito, J., dissenting).
169. Justice Scalia expressed willingness to enforce the dormant Commerce Clause purely on
stare decisis grounds in limited situations, but specifically refused to join the majority opinion's
use of the Pike balancing test because the balancing of values should be left to Congress, not
courts. Id at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring). Despite joining the majority opinion in Carbone,
justice Thomas expressed a newfound desire to discard the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence altogether, arguing it "has no basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable
in practice." Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring).
170. As an initial matter, it is of no consequence that the statute imposes the discriminatory
fee on in-state operators of injection wells, as opposed to the out-of-state haulers of waste. The
Constitutional concern is with the arbitrary discriminatory treatment of the articles of commerce,
not what entity the statute or regulation actually burdens. For example, the unconstitutional fee
in Chemical Waste Management, Part IV.C supra, was levied on operators of an in-state facility. See
504 U.S. at 338-39 (1992). See also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 580 (1997) (holding that there is "no analytic difference" under the dormant commerce
clause between direct discriminatory burdens on out-of-state entities or indirect burdens im-
posed via tax on the in-state businesses they deal with).
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district in which the well is located or within an adjoining oil and gas
resources management regulatory district.171
As previously stated, dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny begins
with an initial determination of whether the statute facially discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce.172 This inquiry is not meant to be a
formalistic search for explicit barriers to interstate commerce, but ra-
ther should focus on the "practical operation of the statute, since the
validity of state laws must be judged chiefly in terms of their probable
effects."173
Section 1509.22 does not explicitly place higher fees on substanc-
es that originate outside of Ohio's borders, but does so for waste that
does not originate "within the division of oil and gas resources man-
agement regulatory district in which the well is located" or within an
adjoining such regulatory district to the well in question. The term
"division of oil and gas resources management regulatory district" is
not defined within Ohio's oil and gas regulations, but apparently the
term refers to the regional offices of the Ohio Division of Mineral Re-
sources Management. 174 The office divides the state into three sec-
tions: a North, South, and West region. These regions are all adjacent to
one another; any region where waste originates must necessarily bor-
der the other two. Thus, the heavier fee imposed by Section
1509.22(H)(1)(b) does not impact any waste that originates within the
state of Ohio. The statute therefore can-and should-be recognized
as facially discriminatory against substances that originate outside the
state's borders. Under Supreme Court precedent, this finding would
trigger a virtual per se finding of invalidity.
This conclusion is not affected by the subtle design of the facial
discrimination, as opposed to explicit language referencing state bor-
ders. Aside from the fact that simple geography makes the phrase "di-
vision of oil and gas resources management regulatory district... [or]
an adjoining oil and gas resources management regulatory district"
interchangeable with "Ohio," the Court has been adept in reading statu-
171. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.22(H)(1) (emphasis added).
172. See Part IV, supra.
173. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 37 (1980). See also W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1994).
174. E-mail from Heidi Hetzel-Evans, Commc'ns Manager, Ohio Dep't of Natural Res. (Decem-
ber 7, 2011, 10:35 CST) (on file with author). See also OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
REGIONAL OFFICES & FIELD INSPECTORS,
http://www.ohiodnr.com/mineral/inspectors/tabid/10355/Default.aspx (last visited June 30,
2012).
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tory language and making common sense determinations on whether
facial discrimination against interstate commerce exists.
For example, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Court held that a Ne-
braska law prohibiting the export of groundwater to any state that did
not grant reciprocal rights served as an "explicit barrier to commerce"
between Nebraska and Colorado, and thus the law facially discriminat-
ed against interstate commerce.17s Although the statute made no ref-
erence whatsoever to Colorado, the Court noted that Colorado law
prohibited the export of groundwater, and as a result, the statute effec-
tively served as a ban on trade with Colorado.176 Thus, the burden fell
on Nebraska to demonstrate that its reciprocity provision served a
legitimate local purpose, and the Court ultimately struck down the
provision as an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate
commerce.177
Additionally, the statute in question in Fort Gratiot prohibited
persons from accepting "solid waste ... that is not generated in the
county in which the disposal area is located" without explicit approval
from the state.178 The state argued that the prohibition was not facially
discriminatory towards interstate commerce because the utilization of
county lines as the relevant borders meant in-state and out-of-state
waste would be treated the same in many instances; the Court, howev-
er, found there was still no reason for Michigan to treat waste from
within the county any differently than waste from outside the coun-
ty.179
B. No Legitimate Local Purpose justifies Facial Discrimination
As explained earlier, a statute that is found discriminatory on its
face will survive a per se finding of invalidity only if it (1) serves a le-
gitimate local purpose, and (2) cannot be served as well by available
nondiscriminatory means.18o While states do retain "broad regulatory
authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integri-
ty of its natural resources" under the Commerce Clause, legitimate
reasons for obstructing the flow of articles in interstate commerce
175. 458 U.S. 941,957 (1982).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 957-58.
178. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep't. of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 357 (1992).
179. Id at 361.
180. See Part IV, supra. See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
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"apart from their origin" must be shown.181 Ohio has advanced no le-
gitimate local purpose for its two tier disposal fee system that is per-
missibly attained through facial discrimination.
Possible local purposes that Ohio could offer to legitimize its two-
tier disposal fee system include (1) raising revenue for its regulatory
program, (2) protecting public health and safety amidst concerns of
the rising amounts of out-of-state flowback water entering its borders,
and (3) requiring that transporters of Pennsylvania waste pay their
fair share for their access to the state's valuable underground storage
space. However, these purposes all should fail dormant commerce
clause scrutiny. The first two-health concerns and revenue genera-
tion-provide no justification for treating in-state waste more favora-
bly. As the Court in Philadelphia made abundantly clear, any legislative
means accomplished through discrimination against out-of-state arti-
cles of commerce is prohibited unless there is some reason, apart from
origin, to treat the articles differently.182 The third purpose-forcing
Pennsylvania industry to pay its fair share and internalize the costs of
its increasing reliance on Ohio well space-has also previously been
rejected by courts as incompatible with the spirit of the Commerce
Clause.
1. Revenue Generation and Public Health Concerns
One of the stated goals of S.B. 165's overhaul of the Ohio oil and
gas laws was to ensure the state regulatory program has "sustainable,
adequate levels [of revenue] through a variety of fees and assessments
upon the regulated industry."183 However, "by itself ... revenue gener-
ation is not a local interest that can justify discrimination against inter-
state commerce."184 As the Court found in United Haulers, revenue
generation is a "cognizable benefit for purposes of the Pike test,"185 but
the Pike balancing test is only applicable where incidental burdens on
181. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151-52.
182. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
183. Niehaus Testimony, supra note 98. Notably, in an effort to raise even more revenue for
the state regulatory program, the original version of S.B. 315 doubled the in-state fee to ten cents
per barrel, but quintupled the out-of-state fee to one dollar per barrel. See S.B. 315, 129th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012) (as introduced), 63-64, available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillTextl29/129-SB-315_IY.pdf. This rate increase was
rejected by the Ohio Senate.
184. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994). See also Armco Inc.
v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984) ("a State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily
when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State").
185. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth, 550 U.S. 330, 346
(2007).
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interstate commerce exist, and is not applicable to facially discrimina-
tory provisions such as Ohio's two-tier disposal fee.
In terms of public health, Ohio has not, and almost certainly can-
not, make a legitimate claim that it is imposing a higher fee on the dis-
posal of out-of-state fracking waste because it is potentially more
hazardous than waste originating from within. That argument derives
from the Court's landmark decision in Maine v. Taylor,186 the lone Su-
preme Court decision where a facially discriminatory statute survived
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
In Maine v. Taylor, the defendant was indicted for violating a state
statute prohibiting the importation of live bait from outside the
state.187 The state argued the ban was a legitimate protection of
Maine's fisheries from non-native invasive species that may be includ-
ed with shipments of out-of-state baitfish.188 Specifically, the state con-
tended certain types of parasites that were not naturally found within
Maine but prevalent in out-of-state baitfish would threaten its indige-
nous fish population, and there was no possible way to sufficiently
inspect shipments for these parasites due to their miniscule size and
the large quantities of shipments.189
The lower court held that the state had not sufficiently demon-
strated any legitimate local purpose served by the ban that could not
have been achieved equally without discriminating against interstate
commerce.190 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the state and
reversed, holding that this ban was not a violation of the Commerce
Clause because (1) it served a legitimate local purpose by protecting
native fisheries, and (2) protecting them could not be achieved as well
by available nondiscriminatory means.191
Even if Ohio were to proffer evidence that the wastes are material-
ly different (e.g., that the fracking industry in Pennsylvania utilizes
different chemicals in its fracking fluid than in Ohio, and thus the out-
of-state flowback water has a materially different chemical composi-
tion), Ohio law nonetheless still permits the disposal of the out-of-state
186. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
187. Id. at 132-33.
188. Id.
189. Id at 141.
190. Id. at 144.
191. Id. at 151. In finding the import ban constitutional, the Court stated that scientifically
accepted techniques for inspection of the baitfish for non-native parasites were minimal or non-
existent, and the "abstract" possibility that these testing procedures would or could be developed




waste in its wells. It would be as if the state in Maine v. Taylor, in an
effort to protect its native fisheries from foreign invasive species, al-
lowed those invasive species into the state's waters if a tax was paid.
The increased revenue from the tax, unless specifically applied to miti-
gation efforts (obviously much more inefficient than an outright ban),
does not combat the risk. Similarly, allowing out-of-state disposal at a
higher price severely undermines any public health justification Ohio
might advance.
2. "Fair Share" Rationale
Ohio could also argue that the heightened fee deters Pennsylva-
nia's industry from transporting mass quantities of fracking waste into
Ohio, and thus compels Pennsylvania to fashion a more local solution
to the waste problem created by its heavy fracking. Put another way,
because Pennsylvania industry is so heavily utilizing disposal wells in
Ohio, one could argue it is only fair for Ohio to be able to charge a pre-
mium price for acceSS.192 After all, Ohio is providing a service to Penn-
sylvania that it cannot provide on its own.193 This free-market
approach also justifies imposing the lower fee on Ohio's waste, because
with less local drilling the demand for disposing in-state waste is low-
er.
This "fair share" rationale assumes that states are individual eco-
nomic units that may make use of a competitive free market in access-
ing their resources, as opposed to members of one unified economic
entity as articulated in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.194
Simply put, a state cannot punish another state or attempt to shift what
it perceives as an unreasonable economic burden through discrimina-
tory legislation.195 The Commerce Clause, as historically interpreted,
192. Furthermore, in environmental regulation, the costs of producing goods or rendering
services are typically expected to be borne by the parties who benefit most. Daniel A. Farber,
Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 26-28 (2007) (describ-
ing the "beneficiary pays" principle).
193. Recall that a UIC well cannot simply be drilled in any location; the wells require a porous
and permeable underground formation that can receive the injection of fluids in a safe manner.
DOE Primer, supra note 1, at 68. Pennsylvania's geology in general is incompatible with the cur-
rent standards for underground injection wells. See Michelle L. Kennedy, The Exercise of Local
Control Over Gas Extraction, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 377 (2011). See also Timothy Puko,
Pennsylvania Fracking Water Being Disposed in Ohio, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEw, July 5, 2011,
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s-745228.html.
194. See Part IV, supra.
195. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 958 n.18 (1982) (refusing to find a discrim-
inatory state statute legitimate under the dormant Commerce Clause when it is a response to
another state's "unreasonable burden" on commerce). See also Envtl. Techs. Council v. South
Carolina, 901 F.Supp. 1026, 1034 (D. S.C. 1995), affd 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
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does not envision the supply and demand of competitive markets gen-
erating barriers between the states:
[T]he negative implications of the commerce clause derive principal-
ly from a political theory of union, not from an economic theory of
free trade. The function of the clause is to ensure national solidarity,
not economic efficiency. Although the Court's commerce clause opin-
ions have often employed the language of economics, the decisions
have not interpreted the Constitution as establishing the inviolability
of the free market.196
While Pennsylvania's absence of an adequate in-state method of
wastewater disposal is no doubt unsatisfying (particularly given the
amount of fracking it permits), its industry still must be allowed unob-
structed access to otherwise accommodating out-of-state disposal fa-
cilities in the interest of national unity. This is particularly true when
national interests as important as domestic energy policy and envi-
ronmental safety are potentially at stake.
Horizontal drilling in conjunction with hydraulic fracturing is a
relatively young technological activity,197 and consequently nearly
every facet of fracking, from drilling to disposal, involves some element
of risk. A comparative risk analysis, however, would likely reveal that
underground injection is one of the more preferable methods of frack-
ing waste disposal, at least for the time being.198 Established under-
ground injection practices are more likely to be able to safely
accommodate growing amounts of potentially toxic fracking waste
than treatment facilities unaccustomed to its unfamiliar chemical
properties. In fact, the U.S. EPA recently announced its intention to
develop federal standards for flowback water from natural gas extrac-
tion, citing the rising levels of domestic natural gas production and the
amount of treatment plants nationwide not properly equipped to han-
state cannot attempt to punish or influence the public policy of other states through protectionist
economic legislation).
196. GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 266 (6th ed. 2009) (quoting L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 417 (2d ed. 1988)).
197. See Part l.A., supra.
198. As previously mentioned in Part II.A. supra, the author is aware of recent concern that
underground injection can possibly trigger earthquakes if done carelessly or improperly. The
need for more stringent seismological and geologic data for Class 11 wells in reaction to increased
amount of injection activity could certainly impact this assessment. A recent study by the National
Academy of Sciences concluded that, although the location of faults is currently not a standard
prerequisite for siting disposal wells, there have only been a handful of "induced seismic events"
linked to the operation of tens of thousands of active injection wells in the United States, and "the
presence of a fault does not necessarily imply an increased potential for induced seismicity." See
Induced Seismicity Study, supra note 67, at 8.
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dle the wastewater.199 These wastewater standards, which are ex-
pected to be proposed for public comment by 2014, will be based on
"demonstrated, economically achievable technologies,"200 and further
demonstrate the need for accessible alternative disposal mechanisms
in the interim.
Ohio's capacity for disposal activity in such close proximity to the
abundant gas resources of the Marcellus Shale can also be seen as a
valuable national resource. While Ohio's pore space not as apparent a
national resource as timber or coal or corn derived from Iowa top-
soil,201 it nevertheless plays an extremely important role in America's
energy future.
Porous subsurface geologic formations are no longer simply
viewed as holes in the ground. Disputes over how to allocate property
rights in these spaces have gradually become more common across the
country and settled by state courts and legislatures.202 In addition to
waste disposal, this underground space is increasingly being consid-
ered for carbon capture and sequestration ("CCS"), which is a key
technology in efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate
climate change.203 As subsurface land rights become more valuable-
199. EPA Announces Schedule to Develop Natural Gas Wastewater Standards, UNITED STATES




201. Discriminatory legislation obstructing free access to these more obvious resources
would clearly violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 538-39 (1949) ("We need only consider the consequences if each of the few states that
produce copper, lead, high-grade iron ore, timber, cotton, oil or gas should decree that industries
located in that state shall have priority. What fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals
would ensue if such practices were begun!")
202. See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 82-11-180 (West 2011) (preserving the property rights of
the surface estate owner in the subsurface); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 47-31-02, 03 (West 2011)
(granting the owner of the surface estate property rights in "pore space," defined as "a cavity or
void, whether natural or artificially created, in a subsurface sedimentary stratum"); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1-152 (West 2011) (defining "pore space" as any "subsurface space which can be used
as storage space for carbon dioxide or other substances," and vesting the property rights in such
space to the surface estate owner). See also Owen L. Anderson, Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who
Owns the Pore Space?, 9 Wyo. L. REv. 97, 99-109 (2009) (considering ownership issues of subsur-
face pore space in Texas).
203. A. Bryan Endres, Geologic Carbon Sequestration: Balancing Efficiency Concerns and Public
Interest in Property Rights Allocations, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 623, 625 (2011) (citing IPCC, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 256 (2007)). Interestingly enough, hydraulic fractur-
ing and CCS may be on a collision course because the fracturing of shale rock formations can
compromise otherwise optimal sites for future safe storage of carbon dioxide. See T. R. Elliot and
M. A. Celia, Potential Restrictions for CO2 Sequestration Sites Due to Shale and Tight Gas Production,
46 ENVTL. SC. & TECH., 4223, 4224 (2012) (finding substantial overlap between potential CCS
reservoirs and shale gas formations).
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in terms of personal wealth as well as America's future domestic ener-
gy and climate change mitigation policies-states should rightly be
prohibited from adopting legislation that arbitrarily discriminates ac-
cess. Such protectionism is reminiscent of the turn of the 20th century
when state laws seeking to conserve natural resources were upheld on
the theory that a state "owned" such resources and could choose
whether or not it wanted to sell them.204 This "natural resources ex-
ception" likely has no vitality in the aftermath of Philadelphia and sub-
sequent "Garbage Wars" decisions.205
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that as long as hydraulic fracturing is a
prevalent method for extracting natural gas, it should be performed in
the least harmful manner possible, from the first day of drilling to the
disposal of the last barrel of waste. Many argue that the safest fracking
is no fracking at all. This may ultimately prove to be correct. However,
as long as a state tolerates the practice of fracking and the disposal of
its waste within its borders, the Constitution prohibits placing discrim-
inatory burdens on out-of-state drillers and haulers, absent a legiti-
mate local purpose that cannot otherwise be served. There is both a
great national economic interest in unrestricted commerce amongst
the states, as well as great local interest in the proper disposal of the
wastes created by fracking. States should be discouraged from at-
tempting to individually profit in such situations at the expense of oth-
ers.
This Note should not be interpreted as arguing that states must
lay out welcome mats for the fracking industry. States retain broad
authority under their general police power and regulatory authority to
heavily supervise fracking and the disposal of its waste if they choose
to do so. But once a state decides to allow these activities within its
borders, it must treat similarly situated foreign waste on the same
footing as its own. Ohio's two-tier disposal fee fails to do so, and thus is
likely unconstitutional. A difference of fifteen cents per barrel may
seem trivial, but the designation of out-of-state waste as distinctive,
purely because of origin, is constitutionally improper. As historically
intended and presently interpreted, the Commerce Clause prohibits
inequitable treatment of articles of commerce, and is unconcerned
204. Verchick,supra note 110, at 1279.
205. Id. at 1279-80.
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whether that treatment is a difference of mere pennies, outright prohi-
bitions, or anything in between.
